Current Legislation and Decisions by Sayre, Eugene G. et al.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 4
1967





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Current Legislation and Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





Securities Exchange Act Section 16(b) - Conversions as
Purchases - Strict v. Ad Hoc Approach
The appellants, Petteys and Reavis, were both noncontrolling' directors
of Northwest Airlines' thirteen member Board of Directors which voted
unanimously to redeem all the outstanding convertible preferred stock of
the corporation. Prior to the redemption date the two directors converted
their preferred stock and obtained a proportionate amount of common
stock.' When they converted the preferred into common, the market value
of the common was greater than the redemption price of the preferred.
Both appellants had held their preferred stock for six months prior to the
conversion. However, within six months after the conversion each direc-
tor sold a portion of his newly acquired common stock at a price above
the market value of the common stock at the time of conversion.' The
directors, Petteys and Reavis, brought a declaratory judgment action
against the corporation seeking to establish that the transaction involved
did not come within the liability for short swing profits of Section 16 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4 Northwest answered that it
'Neither Petteys nor Reavis individually or collectively held a majority of the outstanding
stock of Northwest Airlines.
'The conversion ratio was .9615 shares of common per share of preferred.
'Price ranges of the common stock during the period in question.
a. Redemption price of the preferred-$26.00 per share.
b. Price at the time Petteys:
(1) Converted-$35.00 per share
(2) Sold- $51.00 to $55.50 per share
c. Price at the time Reavis:
(1) Converted-$38.00 per share
(2) Sold- $53.25 to $53.37 per share.
4 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964):
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
the sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter;
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would not prosecute an action against the directors, but, two minority
shareholders, Butler and Blau, instituted a derivative action, seeking a
judgment on behalf of the corporation. The district court, on the basis of
a mechanical application of the statute, found the directors had made a
"purchase" by their conversion and were liable to the corporation for
short swing profits under Section 16(b). The directors appealed from this
judgment, contending the conversions were "forced" ' and therefore were
not "purchases." The Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter
SEC or Commission) filed an amicus curiae brief urging the appellate court
to hold to the strict application of the statute. Held, Reversed and Rend-
ered: The strict mechanical test is not to be applied to insiders where the
facts of the situation show there is no chance for abusing inside informa-
tion to the detriment of the outside shareholders. The questioned transac-
tion could not lead to the abuse that Section 16(b) was enacted to halt.
Therefore, being outside the purpose of the statute, the conversion was
not a purchase within the meaning of the statute, and the directors were
not liable for short swing profits. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, Blau v. Petteys, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
Before enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, one of the
foremost problems in securities trading was the misuse of inside informa-
tion by a corporation's officers, directors, or major shareholders in dealing
in their own corporation's stock for personal profit at the expense of the
outside shareholders. By abusing their fiduciary responsibility, these in-
siders, using advance information, could buy at a low price, wait until the
stock's market value rose, and then sell the stock at a profit. Conversely,
the insider could sell high, cause the market value to drop, and then re-
purchase at a lower price, thereby retaining the same equity interest in the
corporation while also securing a profit for himself. To discourage this
activity, Congress included Section 16(b) in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.' This section does not prohibit either of the above described
transactions, but it does provide that, if the purchase and sale (or sale and
purchase) occurs within six months of each other, then a suit may be
brought by the corporation, or by a shareholder in a derivative action, to
recover the profit of the transaction for the corporation. The purpose of
the section is to deter an insider's short term trading in stocks of his own
but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection [Emphasis added.].
'With the redemption price set at $26.00 per share and the preferred selling at $34.00 per
share the directors had three alternatives: (1) Allow the redemption, (2) sell the preferred in the
market, or (3) convert the preferred. (1) Allowing the redemption would have caused a loss of
$8.00 per share; (2) selling the preferred would have forced the directors to forfeit their equity
ownership in the corporation; (3) therefore a conversion of the preferred was the only reasonable
choice. The result of the redemption call was that 99.98% of all the preferred shares were con-
verted; the court stated it would not take judicial notice of the seventy shares that were not con-
verted.
615 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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corporation by depriving him of any profit made from the transaction!
Section 3 of the Act defines "purchase" to "include any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire."9 During the legislative hearings, prior to
the passage of the act, the administration spokesmen urged that the pro-
visions of Section 16 (b) be applied strictly to all transactions of this kind,
regardless of good faith, because they foresaw the difficulty of proving
the insider's intent to engage in short swing trading. These witnesses ac-
knowledged that some persons might have a hardship worked upon them
by this strict "rule of thumb" test, but that this was the price to be paid
for effective regulation." Possibly because of this hardship, the Commis-
sion was granted the power to exempt transactions that were not con-
templated to come within the comprehension of Section 16(b). The SEC
subsequently exercised this exemptive power by amending Rule 16B-9,"
which is discussed infra.
The Commission's power to exempt is a valid delegation of legislative
power"2 as long as the exemptions are within the standards delineated by
the examples Congress enumerated in the statute. Consequently, this ex-
emptive power is reviewable by the courts, viz. to determine if the regula-
tion is contra to the intent of the statute." With this power 4 the SEC has
a great deal of flexibility in the administration of the statute.
In considering the exemption of conversions of equity securities," courts
' Professor Manne of George Washington University has recently attacked this basic premise,
arguing that a completely free market (one free of insider trading restrictions), would still result
in correct stock prices, and would properly reward those who were responsible for the stock's in-
creased value. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964).
10The operation of section 16(b) was explained by one of its draftsmen, Thomas G. Corcoran,
in hearings on the bill as:
That is to prevent directors receiving the benefits of short-term speculative swings
on the securities of their own companies, because of inside information. The profit on
such transaction under the bill would go to the corporation. You hold the director,
irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security within six months
after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention
or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot
undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended, at the time he
bought, to get out on a short swing [Emphasis added.].
Hearings on S. 56 and 57 (Stock Exchange Practices) Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., part 15, at 6557 (1934).
11 Rule 16B-9, infra note 29.
"Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1945).
aThis was the situation concerning Rule X-16B-3 which exempted restrictive stock option
plans. In Green v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1957), the court stated the exemption was
not solely within the expertise of the Commission but was within the scope of judicial review. Sub-
sequently, in Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a district court
held that the rule was in conflict with the expressed purpose of the statute and therefore invalid.
The Commission later amended this rule to delete the section objectionable to the courts. In neither
of the cases was the insider held liable, for he relied upon the rule in good faith and therefore came
under the prohibition of such liability in section 23 (a).
14 The exemptive power is drawn from § 23(a) of the act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964):
(a) The Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
shall each have power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for
the execution of the functions vested in them by this chapter. ...
'a Section 16(b) applies only to equity securities. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(11),
15 U.S.C. S 78c(a)(11) (1964):
(11) The term "equity security" means any stock or similar security; or any security
convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any
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have taken two different approaches." The strict, literal application of the
statute, declares all conversions to be "purchases." This "strict" test is ap-
plied mechanically by some courts, while others use an "ad hoc" approach
to the problem and therefore develop a more flexible test.
First to consider whether an insider's conversion was a purchase was
the decision of the Second Circuit in Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte7 in
1947. Here the insider, after a redemption call for preferred stock, con-
verted his preferred stock into common and then sold the common stock
within six months. The preferred stock was not protected from dilution,"
was not readily marketable, and the insider was the controlling share-
holder. Judge Clark applied the statute strictly and found the conversion
to be a "purchase" because it fell within the "or otherwise acquire" pro-
vision of the definition of a "purchase." The court's conclusion as to the
insider's liability in this case has not been criticized by the commentators,
but, they have attacked the execessively broad application of the definition
of "purchase."" Then, in the 1965 case of Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,'
the Third Circuit found the conversion of debentures into common stock
and the subsequent sale of the stock within six months to be within the
purview of Section 16 (b) via an application of the "strict" test as enun-
ciated in Park & Tilford. The court concluded that Congress had precluded
the courts from exercising their equitable powers to exempt transactions
from the provisions of Section 16(b) by granting the power of exemption
solely to the Commission."' The SEC has always favored the strict con-
struction enunciated by these courts. The Commission reasoned that with
the exemptive power resting solely in the regulatory body, the strict ap-
plication eliminates the needless litigation encouraged by an analysis of
each factual situation.
In contrast to the "strict" test is the "ad hoc" approach formulated by
the Sixth Circuit in Ferraiolo v. Newman.2 The fact situation in Ferraiolo
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant
or right; or any other [Sic] security which the Commission shall deem to be of
similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it
may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to treat as an
equity security.
"6 Much has been written on these two different approaches. Illustrative of these are: Comment,
The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 YALE L.J. 510,
524 (1950); Comment, Conversion to Avert Redemption is Not a "Short-Swing" Purchase, 11
STAN. L. REv. 358 (1959); Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider
Liabilities under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REV. 949 (1959), (authored by General Counsel of the
SEC); Comment, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The Persistent Problem of Purchase,
Sale, and Debts Previously Contracted, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 474 (1966); and the most exhaustive
work on conversions as purchases, Hamilton, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End
of an Era, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1447 (1966).
17 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947), noted in 59 HARv. L. Ruv.
998 (1948).
18 To prevent dilution of the shareholder's equity ownership his stock must have pre-emptive
rights in any subsequent issue.
192 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1067 (1961).
20352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965), noted in 44 TEXAs L. REv. 555 (1966). The purchase of the
debentures and sale of the converted stock were separated by eight months with the conversion tak-
ing place in the interim.
" The power to exempt is drawn from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 16(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) and S 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).
2259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959), noted in 72 HARv. L.
REV. 1392 (1959).
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was very similar to the present case, viz. the director converted his pre-
ferred stock to avert a loss since the market value of the common stock
was in excess of the redemption price. His sale, within six months, of
some of the common stock acquired from this conversion precipitated a
derivative suit by one of the corporation's shareholders. Judge [now Jus-
tice] Potter Stewart, speaking for the court, reasoned that if there is a
possibility that inside information could be abused to the detriment of the
outside shareholders, then Section 16(b) should be applied and the profit
from the transaction given to the corporation. However, if there is no
chance of abuse, then the transaction does not come within the purpose of
Section 16(b) and there is no reason to apply it to the transaction. This
"ad hoc" approach considers the facts of each case and determines whether
there is a possibility of disadvantaging outside shareholders through mis-
use of inside information. Stewart did not denounce Park & Tilford but
distinguished Ferraiolo on its facts; the preferred stock was protected
against dilution, the director was noncontrolling, the conversion was
"forced" to prevent a loss, both preferred and common stocks were traded
on a national exchange and were economic equivalents2' of each other,
and there was no greater chance of speculation after the conversion than
existed when the director held the preferred.
This "ad hoc" approach, which exempts harmless insider trading, has
been adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Blau v. Max Factor e§ Co.' There
the controlling shareholders, the Factor family, converted one type of
common into another and sold the latter within six months. The purpose
of the conversion was to enhance the market value of the stock. The court
found the insiders not liable because the two common stocks were equiva-
lent investment risks and the conversion was not the kind of "purchase"
comprehended by the drafters of Section 16(b). The "ad hoc" approach
was also adopted by the Second Circuit in Blau v. Lamb," which weakens
the "strict" test announced by the same court in Park & Tilford. In Blau
the "ad hoc" approach was applied to a conversion alleged to be a sale,
and the court found that there was not "any possibility of abuse" and
therefore did not apply Section 16(b). Thus, with the declaration of the
"ad hoc" approach by the Eighth Circuit in the present case, a majority
of the circuits now apply this approach to conversions.
As noted supra, the SEC has constantly favored a strict application of
Section 16(b); it has always cited the Second Circuit's decision in Park
& Tilford as the correct application of the definition of "purchase." Con-
sistent with this policy, the Commission filed an amicus curiae brief in this
litigation urging the Eighth Circuit to adopt this mechanical approach.
" When the price of the common stock rises above the redemption price, then the preferred
will sell at a price proportionate to the common's price. This price is determined by the conversion
ratio. In this instance the ratio is .9615 and the stocks were selling on the national exchange at
$34.00 for the preferred and $36.00 for the common. Therefore the stocks were economic equiva-
lents.
24 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965), noted in 26 U. PITT. L.
REv. 870 (1966).
25363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967), noted in 35 FORD. L.
REv. 143 (1966).
1967]
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However, even the Second Circuit, since announcing that view in Park &
Tilford, has not applied the definition of "purchase" to such an all-encom-
passing degree. In the case of stock purchase warrants, this same court
found an abuse could not occur" and, Judge Clark, who first implemented
the "strict" test, recognized, in another instance, that some cases were
not within the intent of the statute. He ruled a reclassification of stock
was not a "purchase" under Section 16(b).*2 In reaching this conclusion
he commented, "we are not inclined at this juncture to attempt enuncia-
tion of a black letter rubric.""s Because of the refusal by the circuits to
follow the strict approach the SEC amended Rule 16B-9 on 17 February
1966, so that it now exempts all conversion transactions from the appli-
cation of Section 16(b) unless the purchase, conversion, and sale all take
place within six months. The Commission applied the exemption only
prospectively' ° (retrospective application would have remedied this instant
situation), and, as mentioned above, filed an amicus curiae brief in the
present litigation attempting to obtain a "strict" application of Park
Tilford.
In considering the present case the Eighth Circuit found the "strict"
test too harsh on the directors, reasoning that the "ad hoc" approach was
more appropriate. The court felt no restraint in exercising its equitable
power to exempt the conversion, unlike the Third Circuit in Heli-Coil.
Here, Park & Tilford, as in Ferraiolo, was distinguished on the facts. The
preferred was protected against dilution, the preferred and common were
economic equivalents" selling at proportionate prices on the national ex-
change, the directors were noncontrolling, and the conversion was
2"Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949).
27 Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
1Sld. at 85.
2Exemption from Section 16(b) of Transactions Involving the Conversion of Equity Securities.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16B-9 (1967):
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in the conversion
of an equity security which, by its terms or pursuant to the terms of the corporate
charter or other governing instruments, is convertible immediately or after a stated
period of time into another equity security of the same issuer, shall be exempt from
the operation of Section 16 (b) of the Act; Provided, however, That this rule shall not
apply to the extent that there shall have been either (i) a purchase of any equity
security of the class convertible (including any acquisition of or change in a con-
version privilege) and a sale of any equity security of the class issuable upon con-
version, or (ii) a sale of any equity security of the class convertible and any purchase
of any equity security issuable upon conversion, (otherwise than in a transaction
involved in such conversion or in a transaction exempted by any other rule under
Section 16(b)) within a period of less than six months which includes the date of
conversion.
(b) For the purpose of this rule, an equity security shall not be deemed to be
acquired or disposed of upon conversion of an equity security if the terms of the
equity security converted require the payment or entail the receipt, in connection with
such conversion, of cash or other property (other than equity securities involved in the
conversion) equal in value at the time of conversion to more than 1 5% of the value
of the equity security issued upon conversion.
(c) For the purpose of this rule, an equity security shall be deemed convertible
if it is convertible at the option of the holder or of some other person or by operation
of the terms of the security or the governing instruments.
S"As originally formulated new Rule 16B-9 would have applied retrospectively. Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 7750 (1965).
" Economic equivalents, supra note 23.
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"forced ' to prevent a loss caused by a lower redemption price. In deciding
this conversion was not a "purchase," the court reasoned that (1) in this
instance an application of "black letter rubric" would be unfair to the di-
rectors, (2) the purpose and literal demands of Section 16(b) are equal
in value and the latter will not be applied if the former is not met, and
(3) there was full disclosure and no opportunity for the insiders to profit
at the expense of the outside shareholders."3 Though the court discussed
amended Rule 16B-9, it was not applied, for an application of the "ad
hoc" approach was sufficient in itself to exempt this conversion. The court
did note that Rule 16B-9 set forth the correct approach, because, if the
insider held the convertible securities longer than six months, a conversion
would add no opportunity for profit that was not previously existing.
It is submitted that the "ad hoc" approach, as formulated in Ferraiolo,
is the better method of applying Section 16 (b) to conversion transactions.
The "strict" test as set out in Park &q Tilford, with but one execption," has
lost credence ever since it was first espoused. When a court employs the
"ad hoc" approach, the insider must prove there is no violation of Section
16 (b).' If the insider is successful in proving the absence of detriment to
outsiders, even though his actions would, if taken at face value, meet the
literal demands of the statute, then the inequity of the "strict" approach
will be avoided. Some commentators have suggested that Section 16(b)
should be applied only to actual trading situations, but this approach over-
looks the broad definition of purchase (which includes the phrase "or
otherwise acquire")." The mechanical application of Section 16 (b) would
have caused the insiders to suffer a loss of any profits made from sales
within six months of the conversion, while an outside shareholder would
have been able to sell at anytime and keep his profit. Thus, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's adoption of the "ad hoc" approach was appropriate because it pre-
vented inequitable treatment of insiders who made full disclosures. The
prospect of further litigation of the strict v. ad hoc application of Section
16(b) is unlikely unless the validity of the Commission's amended Rule
16B-9 is challenged."7
Eugene G. Sayre
" Forced conversion, supra note 5.
83 Here 99.98% of the holders of convertible preferred converted. The court, in reasoning
whether to apply 16(b) where there is no chance for abuse, said, "Cessante ratione legis, cessat et
ipsa lex." (When the reason of law ceases, law itself ceases to operate).
" The exception is the third circuit's decision in Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, supra note 20.
as It has been suggested that Congress, by enacting a strict statute, sought to shift the burden
of proving a short term speculative intent on the part of the insider away from the prosecuting
shareholder. Comment, 64 MICH. L. Rrv. 474 (1966), supra note 16.
as Definition of Purchase, supra note 9.
" The blanket exemption for conversion as adopted by the Commission in Rule 16B-9 may have
gone too far in the opposite direction of the original strict rule of thumb test. Under the present
regulation even transactions such as the one in Park & Tilford will be exempted from attack by
a derivative suit under section 16(b). Perhaps this approach is justified because of the reduction
in litigation on the question of purchase that will follow. However, the rule will have to be
amended further if it allows abuse to occur as Rule X-16B-3 did in the Greene v. Dietz and Perl-
man v. Timberlake cases, supra note 13.
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A wrongful death action was instituted against Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
for death resulting from the fatal crash of an Eastern Air Lines Constella-
tion in Florida on December 21, 19 5 5. Eastern alleged that its liability was
limited under the Warsaw Convention.' The plaintiff, attempting to re-
cover damages in excess of the Warsaw limitation,' alleged in the alterna-
tive that (1) the carrier was guilty of wilful misconduct or, (2) that
the carrier failed to make sufficient delivery of a ticket' under the Con-
vention. In the lower court Eastern conceded that it could not maintain
its burden of proof to show that it was without fault.! However, the court
found that Eastern was neither negligent nor guilty of wilful misconduct.
But the trial' without jury resulted in an award to plaintiff of the
$8300.00 limitation. Held: Affirmed. The issues of wilful misconduct and
negligence were bound together in this case and the burden of proving
both rested with the plaintiff; as plaintiff had not carried his burden of
proof, consideration of plaintiff's contentions regarding delivery of the
ticket was unnecessary. Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 369 F.2d 874
(3rd Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3107 (Aug. 22,
1967) (No. 528).
Without the Warsaw Convention, there would be numerous conflicts
of law problems in action involving international flights.
The Convention of Warsaw consists of a code which lays down certain
conditions of contract for international carriage. It defines and limits the
rights of passengers and owners of cargo in such carriage, and the corres-
' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, 12 Oct. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1929), T.S. 876 (1934). The Hague Protocol, to which the
United States is not a party, was adopted in 1955; it was a partial revision of the Convention, e.g.,
it increased the limit of liability from $8300 to $16,600. The United States Supplemental Agree-
ment which went into effect May 1966 is another attempt to increase the limit of liability. It is
based on agreements between carriers, which limit liability to $75,000.00 in some instances and
$58,000 in others.
2Article 22(1) of the Convention provides: "In the transportation of passengers the liability of
the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs .... ($8921.87).
a Article 3 (1) of the Convention provides: "In respect to the carriage of passengers a ticket
shall be delivered containing: (c) a notice to the effect that . . . the Warsaw Convention may
be applicable .... Article 3 (2) provides: "The absence, irregularity or loss of the passenger ticket
does not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of carriage which shall, none the less,
be subject to the rules of this Convention. Nevertheless, if, with consent of the carrier, the passenger
embarks without a passenger ticket having been delivered . . . the carrier shall not be entitled to
avail himself of the provisions of Article 22."
4 Article 20(1) of the Convention provides: "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he
and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him and them to take such measures."
'The trial upon which this appeal is based was the fifth trial of this case at the district court
level. The first two, with juries, ended in mistrials. The third trial ended with a jury finding of
wilful misconduct on the part of the carrier but was reversed by the appellate court on evidentiary
grounds. The fourth trial before a jury ended with a verdict for the plaintiff, without a finding of
wilful misconduct, but with a recovery not to exceed the Convention limitation. However, the Dis-
trict Court, upon plaintiff's motion, vacated its judgment and granted a new trial.
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ponding liabilities of the carrier. [I]t imposes upon the carrier a limited
liability in most cases of accident .. .and an unlimited liability in some.'
In addition to providing uniformity of laws applicable to international
air carriage, the Warsaw Convention provides in Article 22 for the limi-
tation of the financial liability of the carrier to $8291.87 [hereinafter
$8300]. Realizing that the cause of an aircraft accident might never be
ascertained, the drafters also set out that a carrier would be presumptively
liable when an accident occured7 but could rebut the presumption and
avoid liability! Additionally, exceptions were drafted into the Convention
which provide for unlimited carrier liability in cases of either failure to
deliver a passenger ticket9 or wilful misconduct."0 Thus, a plaintiff who
will be satisfied with an $8300 recovery may simply allege injury,"' but
a plaintiff who desires to recover more than $8300 must do one of three
things: (1) successfully invoke Article 1 (1) ," which will make the Con-
vention irrelevant to the litigation (thus, the laws of the country in
which the action is brought would determine the amount to be recovered),
(2) plead wilful misconduct, or (3) plead the carrier's failure to deliver
to the passenger a ticket with an adequate notice of liability."3
As to the last point, English authorities hold that a carrier failing to
deliver a sufficient ticket remains prima facie liable; it is not entitled to
the benefits of the Convention but is subject to its liabilities. 4 American
61 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 43 (2d ed. 1966).
Article 17 of the Convention provides: "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger,
if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."
8 Article 20 (1) of the Convention quoted in part, supra note 4. Under the United States Supple-
mental Agreement of 1966 the carrier is absolutely liable, with a financial liability limit of $75,000,
and is not allowed to rebut this presumption of liability. For a discussion of the history which gave
rise to this supplemental agreement see infra note 27.
9 See Article 3 (2), supra note 3. For a discussion of the history of the drafting of Article 3 (2)
see, H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, 266-72 (1954).
i0 Article 25 (1) of the Convention provides: "The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself
of the provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused
by his wilful misconduct."
" The Second Circuit applied the Convention in Grey v. American Airlines, Inc. In stating that
the carrier was absolutely liable under the Convention and recognizing that liability may be avoided
through Article 20, the court said,
As to this it is plain that the burden of proof is on the carrier. And in passing, it
may be noted that in most if not all serious accidents, whether or not members of
the crew survive, the difficulties in avoiding this presumptive liability would seem to
be insurmountable.
Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989
(1956).
" Article I(1) of the Convention provides: "This Convention applies to all international car-
riage of persons, luggage, or goods performed by aircraft for reward .. " The reference to "all
international carriage" impliedly excludes carriage which is not international in nature.
" Delivery of a ticket which fails to give adequate notice of liability results in an insufficient
delivery of the ticket.
14 Westminster Bank, Ltd. v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., [1936] 2 All E.R. 890. This case involved
a failure to deliver an air consignment note that listed all the particulars required by the Conven-
tion, rather than an inadequate delivery of a passenger ticket, but the statements that outline limited
liability and avoidance of liability apply equally to a failure to comply with the ticket requirements
and the air consignment note requirements. In giving judgment for the plaintiff the court held that
under the Warsaw Convention the carrier is prima facie liable for injuries that occur during the
coursq of transport, that the carrier can avoid this liability through Article 20, but that it is ab-
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cases are unequivocal in holding that without delivery of a sufficient ticket
the carrier is absolutely liable for the full amount of any damages proven
by the plaintiff.15 In Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee,0 the carrier argued that its
liability was limited because it had delivered a ticket, but the court found
that the ticket delivery was insufficient because the size of the print made
the notice of liability inadequate, and consequently the carrier could not
limit its liability nor avail itself of any defense provided by the Con-
vention.'Both Lisi and Mertens v. Flying Tiger Airlines, Inc.'s discussed
delivery of a passenger ticket with adequate notice of liability. In Mertens
the carrier argued that Article 3 (2) merely requires delivery of a pas-
senger ticket,19 but the court said that Article 3 (2) requires a delivery of
a ticket that will afford the passenger a reasonable opportunity to take
some self-protective measures.' ° The court reasoned that otherwise there
would have been no reason for the Convention (1) to require that the
ticket state the limited liability of the carrier, (2) to require that the
ticket be delivered to the passenger, and (3) then further to provide for
a higher limit of liability if the carrier and passenger so agree."
Once a court determines that Article 25 or Article 3 (2) applies, the
burden of proving inadequate delivery of a ticket or wilful misconduct
then becomes crucial. Some writers think that the "quid pro quo" for the
Convention's absolute but limited recovery is the shift of the burden of
proof to the carrier.2 Thus, if the plaintiff seeks an amount above the
Convention limit, the burden lies with him to establish the necessary ele-
solutely and unlimitedly liable if it fails to deliver an adequate air consignment note. See also
Philippson v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., [1939] 63 Lloyd's List L.R. 119.
Shawcross and Beaumont note that "When a carrier has failed to deliver a ticket he will be
absolutely liable for the full amount of any damages arising under Articles 17 or 19 . . . . and
since the carrier is not entitled to avail himself of the provisions of Article 20(1) and probably
Article 21 which exclude this liability, nor of those which limit it, he remains subject to his full
prima facie liability." I C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 6 at 441.
" Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S.
Nov. 7, 1967) (No. 70); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 830, reb. denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965).
'0370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
1Id. at 514. In Mertens the notice of the carrier's limited liability "was so printed in such
manner as to virtually be unnoticeable and unreadable." 341 F.2d at 857. In criticizing the "Lilli-
putian print" of the ticket the court held at the same page that "as a matter of law" the delivery
of the ticket was inadequate. But see Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 329 F.2d 302 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964). Lisi quoted the Mertens decision with approval and rea-
soned that a condition precedent to the carrier's defense of limited liability is delivery to the pas-
senger of a ticket which gives him notice that his recovery is limited in the event of a crash. 370
F.2d at 513.
"8341 F.2d 851 and 370 F.2d 508.
" The carrier maintained that the Article 3(2) requirements are less than those of Article 4(4).
which requires that a luggage ticket state all the particulars of the article. This interpretation of
the distinction between the articles had been upheld in the Grey litigation where the court stated:
"Art. 3(2) merely requires that the ticket be delivered to the passengers and thus clearly differs
from Articles 4(4) and 9. I must conclude that this omission or difference is most significant."
Grey v. American Airlines, 95 F. Supp. 756, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The Lisi court distinguished
the Grey rule that mere ticket delivery is sufficient by saying that the ticket issued in Grey
involved the failure of the carrier to list a stopping place. "As the failure to list such a stopping
place did not change the international character of the flight, the passenger was not deprived of a
reasonable opportunity to take self-protective measures." Therefore, the ticket had been delivered.
370 F.2d at 513.
'0341 F.2d at 856.
11 d. at 857.
25 See H. DRsoN, LIMITATION OF LIABILrrES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, 12, 18-26 (1954).
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
ments of Articles 25 or Article 3 (2). If wilful misconduct is at issue the
plaintiff must bear the burden of proof. 3 If the plaintiff alleges inadequate
ticket delivery, the Mertens court said, indirectly, that the plaintiff must
prove non-delivery of a ticket or delivery of an insufficient ticket: "The
jury decided that plaintiff had failed to prove .. .that no ticket was ever
delivered to the decedent." 4 A plaintiff, then, has the burden of proving
inadequate ticket delivery just as he must prove wilful misconduct. The
rationale is that when a plaintiff seeks more than the $8300 limitation of
liability, he must bear the burden of proving his cause for avoiding the
limitation. It is clear that when a plaintiff alleges inadequate ticket de-
livery, even in conjunction with wilful misconduct, he is required to
prove only one of these two allegations."
Under the Convention, unless the carrier proves the contrary, it is pre-
sumed to be negligent. Hence the unusual decision in Berguido, the first
case to adjudge a carrier non-negligent without the carrier's proving that
it was without fault. Indeed, in Berguido, the carrier admitted that it
could not prove its lack of negligence. The court then went further and
placed the burden of proving negligence on the plaintiff because he sought
to recover on the ground of inadequate ticket delivery as well as wilful mis-
conduct." In this the court erred because the plaintiff always has available
the presumption of liability set out in Article 17: if the plaintiff pleads
wilful misconduct and fails to prove it, he should be entitled to have
judgment entered in his favor on the negligence issue unless the carrier
rebuts the presumption of fault.
Mertens is in stark contrast to Berguido on this issue because in Mertens
the issues of wilful misconduct and inadequate ticket delivery were raised
and, although the plaintiff failed to prove wilful misconduct, the ticket
was inadequate and he was allowed a new trial on the issue of damages
alone. Mertens clearly implies that negligence and wilful misconduct are
not bound together and that the plaintiff should never have to prove
negligence under the Convention. Stated another way, the plaintiff only
has to prove facts that will increase liability.
In conclusion, an award of any amount with a specific finding that the
carrier was without fault is inconsistent and impossible under the Warsaw
Convention. Unless the carrier affirmatively shows that it was without
fault, the plaintiff is entitled to the limited award with an unlimited award
23 Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955). Shawcross and Beaumont,
in their discussion of the loss of the carrier's protection due to wilful misconduct suggest that,
"The burden of proving that the carrier has lost its protection is presumably on the plaintiff."
1 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 6 at 456.
24 341 F.2d at 856. Notwithstanding this jury finding, the court found the ticket inadequate
as a matter of law.
" The ticket problem was ruled out as an issue during the pre-trial hearing. For this reason, the
plaintiff, even though he had a valid point, was foreclosed from ever raising the issue again. Also,
the plaintiff himself assumed that without a valid ticket the Convention rule of presumed negli-
gence did not apply, that the litigation was outside he Convention, and that he had to prove negli-
gence. It was only on petition for re-hearing that the plaintiff first recognized his mistake. Article
3 (2) plainly states that even with an inadequate ticket delivery the contract of carriage is still
under the rules of the Convention.
" The court apparently reached its decision on the theory that the scheme of the Convention
does not support unlimited liability.
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always an existing possibility. The articles of the Convention are of equal
weight; hence, the articles providing for absolute but limited liability
cannot be interpreted so as to exclude or overrule the article providing for
unlimited recovery.
As an aside to the Berguido issues, one can predict that the Lisi decision
holding that a ticket must effectively warn the passenger that his recovery
is limited in order to be validly delivered is, in all probability, going to be
a bitter pill for the airlines. Either the carriers will have to show in bold-
face print the limitation of liability (with all its attendant psychological
effects) or the courts are going to take this perfect avenue to avoid a
limitation that has become the source of extreme discontent within the
United States.27
Joan T. Winn
17 On I5 November 1965 the United States sent a Notice of Denunciation to the Polish Govern-
ment stating that this country opposed the Convention's low limits on liability for personal injuries,
and would withdraw from the Convention at the end of six months. On 14 May 1966 the United
States withdrew this notice. For a discussion of the subject see The Warsaw Convention-Recent
Developments and the Withdrawal of the United States Denunciation, 32 J. Air L. & Com. 243
(1966).
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Procedure - Service on Foreign Aircraft Corporation -
Distributors
Plaintiff, B.B.P. Association, an Idaho corporation, purchased an air-
craft from defendant Idaho Aviation Center, Inc., (hereinafter Center),
also an Idaho corporation. Center was engaged in the business of retailing,
servicing, and repairing aircraft manufactured by an additional defend-
ant, Cessna Aircraft Company, a Kansas corporation. Two months after
the purchase of the aircraft, plaintiff discovered that it was mechanically
defective. After examination of the defective engine, Cessna and Center
agreed to furnish and install a new engine. Plaintiff subsequently discov-
red that the malfunction had not been corrected, and that, as a result, the
aircraft was not safe to fly. Plaintiff brought an action against Cessna in
the Idaho District Court for breach of warranty and fraudulent misrep-
resentation. Cessna specially appeared and moved to quash the complaint
on the grounds that it was not doing business in the State of Idaho. Motion
was granted and the plaintiff appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Held,
Reversed: Where "minimum contacts" necessary for extraterritorial jur-
isdiction have been established, a foreign corporation's actions constitute
"doing business" within that forum. B.B.P. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 420 P.2d 134 (Idaho 1966).
The question of whether a foreign corporation is subject to jurisdiction'
in the courts of a state other than that in which it is incorporated arose
early in the 19th Century. At that time it was believed that a corpora-
tion could engage in activities outside its state of incorporation only with
the permission of the state in whose jurisdiction it sought to operate. Fol-
lowing this concept, the Supreme Court held in Pennoyer v. Neff' that a
judgment against a nonresident defendant was void unless the defendant
appeared or was served personally in the forum state. As the advantages
of the corporate form of business became more apparent and corporations
became "the common method of carrying on economic activity,"' the
development of procedures by which corporate entities could be sued in
a foreign state became even more imperative. This result was accomplished
by extending to corporations the concepts used to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over individuals. The first theory to evolve was "consent," express or
implied, by a corporation to be sued in a foreign state. Next, the courts
The instant note is concerned solely with the question of in personam jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation as distinguished from in personam jurisdiction over a domestic corporation or
individual.
'Chief Justice Taney expressed this requirement in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
519, 588 (1839). "[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the
law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have
no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty."
'95 U.S. 714 (1877).
' Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and The In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 578 (1958).
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used the term "presence within the state" to supplement the first theory.
Finally, the concept of "doing business' unfolded to rectify the shortcom-
ings of the two prior fictions.!
The "consent" theory found its origin in the power of a sovereign to
exercise its discretion in the determination of who should be allowed to
transact business within its boundaries. This concept was approved by the
Supreme Court in 1855 when it was stated, "A corporation created by
[one state] can transact business in [another state] only with the consent,
express or implied, of the latter State."' As a result, a state could require a
foreign corporation to appoint expressly an agent or representative to re-
ceive process within that state.! If no agent was so appointed, the courts
would construe such inaction as a waiver of the right to choose a specific
agent, the right then passing to the state itself. Confusion arose as to when
this theory applied. There were questions as to whether the doctrine was
limited to transactions arising within the state,' whether the concept would
interfere with interstate commerce,' and whether the state's power ex-
tended to the regulation of a foreign corporation's conduct within the
state.' ° Despite these ambiguities, some courts continued to rely on the
"tconsent" theory. Finally, in order to assure due process, in the applica-
tion of the theory, the Supreme Court restricted state discrimination
against foreign corporations in order to limit findings of consent when
completely unwarranted."s
Because of the limitations imposed on the "consent" theory, courts
gradually began to place more emphasis on the idea of a foreign corpora-
tion being "present" within its jurisdiction. This "presence" theory be-
came a supplement, extension, and finally a substitute for "consent.""2 As
'The study of the history of in personam jurisdiction is usually divided into three theories:
consent, presence, and doing business. The first two theories are mere fictions in that consent and
presence within the state is inferred from the activities of the corporation. These theories over-
lapped each other in development and, therefore, no boundaries of beginning or ending exist. For
a detailed history of the development of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations see:
Von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV.
1121 (1966); Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and The In Personam juris-
diction of State Courts, 25 U. CMi. L. REV. 569 (1958); Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over
Nonresidents-The Louisiana "Long Arm" Statute, 40 TUL. L. REV. 366 (1966).
0Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).7 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929); Pennsylvania Fire
Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
'See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882). See also Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Ins. Co.
v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407 (1905); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
" See, e.g., International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); International Textbook
Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
"
0 See New York, Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628 (1894), which held
that a state could not regulate the conduct of a foreign railroad corporation in another jurisdiction,
even though the company had tracks and did business in the state making the attempt.
' See Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426 (1926), which held that "a state
cannot use its power to exclude a foreign corporation from local business as a means of accom-
plishing that which is forbidden to the state, such as the regulation of conduct in another juris-
diction."
saInternational Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914) was a harbinger of subse-
quent total reliance on presence. There the Supreme Court held that "[t]he presence of a corpora-
tion within a State necessary to the service of process is shown when it appears that the corpora-
tion is there carrying on business in such sense as to manifest its presence within the State .. "
See generally Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Philadelphia
& Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ky., 201 US, 530
(1907).
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the Supreme Court stated in Philadelphia Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, "A
foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability,
in the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in
such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is
present there."'" In applying the test, courts looked for transactions within
the state of the forum which were sufficiently extensive and continuous
as to reasonably justify trial away from home. 4 The vagueness of the test
left the courts with a need to interpret exactly what or which activities
constituted "presence." The situation predictably resulted in conflicting
decisions, thus making the search for a more definitive theory inevitable.
As a consequence, the courts attempted to eliminate inconsistencies by
merging the two older fictions into what is now known as the "doing
business" concept. Various committees" and courts" struggled with the
principles of "doing business" in the attempt to determine under what
circumstances a foreign corporation might find itself subject to jurisdic-
tion. The Supreme Court took the opportunity in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington" to reconcile prior definitions" of "doing business" and to
establish a workable definition for future litigation. There it was stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'
[Emphasis added.]."5
The court qualified its "minimum contacts" test by stating that "whether
due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.""0
Sufficient minimum contacts with the forum are readily satisfied when
the activity is substantial, systematic, and continuous.' However, in other
situations the question of sufficiency is not as clear. Considering whether
"a 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
4 See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
IS RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, § 167, comment a at 244 (1934): "Doing business
is doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit, or doing a
single act for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts."
"0See, e.g., Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); Frene v. Louisville Cement
Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E.
915 (1917).
'7326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"See, e.g., Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); Frene v. Louisville Cement
Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Tauza v. Susquerhanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E.
915 (1917).
9326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). It should be noted at this point that the terminology as used
in International Shoe is: sufficient "minimum contacts" to constitute "doing business." However,
most courts use the phrases "minimum contacts" and "doing business" interchangeably.
20326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
'2 The activities of a corporation may be so continuous and substantial as to justify suit on a
cause of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities. Missouri, K. & T. Ry.
v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921), aff'd per curiam; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. 220 N.Y.
259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). However, a corporation's activities may be continuous in nature and
yet not be sufficient to support service on an unrelated activity. Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v.
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). See
generally Ruff v. Manhattan Oil Co., 172 Minn. 585, 216 N.W. 331 (1927); Tomson v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 88 Neb. 399, 129 N.W. 529 (1911).
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an isolated, single transaction or contract would constitute sufficient
minimum contacts, the Supreme Court in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co." held that, "[I]t is sufficient for purposes of due process that the
suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that
State."' The McGee case seems to foster unpredictable results through its
extension of the doctrine of minimum contacts by establishing a trend
"toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other non-residents.""4 However, Hanson v. Denckla"
closed the door to any possible notion of broadening this trend. The re-
strictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts are considered not a
mere guarantee of immunity from inconvenience but a result of territorial
limitations. Moreover, a defendant could not be called upon to defend
himself in a foreign state "unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with
that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him."2
Hanson went further than merely limiting McGee to its fact situation,
i.e., a single insurance contract solicited via United States mail. Although
the quality and nature of a defendant's activity will vary, the court
deemed it essential that there be some act by which the defendant purpose-
fully avails himself of the privileges of conducting activities within the
state, thus "invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."2 Although
the court in Hanson seemed to favor a limited application, the trend has
been toward a relaxation of limitations on personal jurisdiction." For in-
stance, the courts have said that if a foreign corporation's business activi-
ties in a state are sufficiently extensive, it is amenable to suit in that state
"even upon a cause of action arising outside of the state." 2
Although there can be no precise legal formula for the determination
of when a corporation is "doing business," i.e., when it has "minimal
contacts" within a state, past cases illustrate fact situations which have
been held to amount to "doing business." Indeed, what constitutes "doing
business" so as to subject a foreign corporation to in personam jurisdiction
is determined from the facts of each case." For instance, though occasional
and isolated acts may not be sufficient to require a corporation to apply
for a license to do business in the forum state, such acts may support
service of process."2 Maintaining an office 2 or an agent to solicit busi-
2355 U.S. 220 (1957).
23 Id. at 223.
24 ld. at 222.
23 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
261id. at 251.2 Id. at 253.
28 In Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1963) it was stated that "[t]he
more recent federal cases have greatly relaxed the due process limitations on personal jurisdiction."
2'9 Id. at 67.
"0See, e.g., Roack v. American Distilling Co., 97 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1938); Real Silk Hosiery
Mills, Inc. v. Philadelphia Knitting Mills Co., 46 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1930); Cornegie Office Appliance
Co. v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 28 F.2d 626 (D.N.C. 1928); Maverick Mills v. Davis, 294 F. 404
(D. Mass. 1923); Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ind. 1962);
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 200 S.C. 393, 21 S.E.2d 34 (1942).
" People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918).
2See, e.g., Elgin Laboratories, Inc. v. Utility Mfg. Co., 26 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1939);
International Shoe Co. v. Lovejoy, 219 Iowa 204, 257 N.W. 576 (1934); Hartstein v. Siedenbach's
Inc., 221 A.D. 798, 223 N.Y.S. 872 (1927). Contra, Costello v. Lee, 43 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).
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ness," or making contracts are all viewed as evidence of "doing business."
All such evidence is considered but no single factor is necessarily conclu-
sive. Although stated some thirteen years prior to International Shoe,
Justice L. Hand's analysis of "doing business" might well be applicable
today. "It is quite impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases,
we must step from tuft to tuft and across the morass. '
Whether Cessna was subject to the jurisdiction of Idaho must be de-
termined by an examination of the degree of activities, if any, engaged in
by Center on behalf of Cessna. To satisfy the International Shoe test of
"doing business," the activities of Center had to be of such a "quality and
nature" that "certain minimum contacts" were established which do not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Super-
ficially, the marketing system of Cessna gave the appearance that no
control was maintained over its dealer. However, Cessna did exercise some
control over the dealer, as evidenced by the power of Cessna to sell in the
dealer's territory. Cessna's advertising program, the use of a uniform ac-
counting method, maintenance of Cessna parts, participation in an identi-
fication program and the sending of repairmen to adjust malfunctioning
engines were all further evidence of the exercise of control over the dealer.
Most of the noted programs or activities were "optional" or "recom-
mended" by Cessna. But the fact that the programs were optional was
merely evidence, and not conclusive of the lack of an existing relationship
between the parties. Moreover, the conclusion as to the legal relationship
between Cessna and Center was affected by consideration of similar affili-
ations."
The relationship of an agent, independent contractor, dealer, or repre-
sentative with a foreign corporation is as dependent on specific fact situa-
tions as are other elements of "doing business." Courts have been guided
by the power which is vested in the representative to act in behalf or bind
the principal," and by the power of the principal to control (directly or
" International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
'Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). L. Hand, J., in defining
"doing business" stated:
Possibly the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation of business will
serve without more. The answer made in Green v. C., B. & Q. RR. Co., 205 U.S.
530 . . . and People's Tob. Co. v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 . . . perhaps
becomes somewhat doubtful in the light of International Harvester Co. v. Ky., 234
U.S. 579 . . . and, if it still remains true, it readily yields to slight additions. In
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. . . there was no more, but the business was con-
tinuous and substantial. Purchases, though carried on regularly, are not enough
(Rosenberg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 . . .) nor are the activities of
subsidiary corporations (Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 364 . . .
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 . . .), or of connecting
carriers (Philadelphia & Read. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 . . .). The maintenance
of an office, though always a make-weight, and enough, when accompanied by con-
tinuous negotiation, to settle claims (St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S.
218 . . .), is not of much significance (Davega, Inc. v. Lincoln Furniture Co., 29
F.2d 164 (C.C.A. 2). It is quite impossible to establish any rule from the decided
cases; we must step from tuft to tuft and across the morass." Hutchinson v. Chase
& Gilbert, supra at 141-42.
U5See Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117, 129 n. 16 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
s Sullivan v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 22 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1938); Mas v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co.,
34 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Va. 1940). (Doing business depended on the "extent of authority delegated
to, and duties performed by" the representative.).
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indirectly) the activities of its agent." A principal has been held to be
"doing business" when its agent or representative has entered a state to
service engines" or solicit business while making collections and supervis-
ing dealers.39 A local representative may be held to be "doing business" for
a principal by merely undertaking to act or represent the corporation.4 '
"Independent" automobile dealers may be viewed as having made mini-
mum contacts for the manufacturer if the corporation "reserves the right
to sell to other dealers,"" or to ship automobiles into the state" or if the
dealer settles claims for the corporation.43 Participating in an advertising
and identification program" or using a standardized franchise' has also
been held to constitute "doing business" in the forum state for the benefit
of the principal. Generally, the principal must exercise some measure of
control over the business entrusted to the representative or the agent must
serve in a representative capacity."
Obviously an infinite number of combinations of activities could con-
stitute "minimal contacts" within a forum; moreover, courts look not to
form but to the substance of the relationship. For instance, even the
actions of an independent contractor may be construed as "doing business"
for a principal. 7 Because a wide variety of fact situations have been ad-
judicated, almost any relationship could be well qualified by case law.
Whether the activities which Center performed for Cessna amounted to
"doing business" is a matter of interpretation; and the court's determina-
tion in the instant case was guided, although without specific recognition,
by previously established criteria."4 The court considered the nature and
character of the business,4 the nature and type of activities within the
17 See, e.g., Focht v. Southwestern Skyways, 220 F. Supp. 441, 443 (D. Colo. 1963) where it was
stated that it is "not merely a matter of the frequency of contacts, it is also the extent of control
that a corporation exerts in a state by means of devices such as the distributor agreement.
See generally Irons v. Rogers, 166 F. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
"s See, e.g., Milbank v. Standard Motor Const. Co., 132 C.A. 67, 22 P.2d 271 (1933).
39 See, e.g., La Porte Heinekamp Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 24 F.2d 861 (D. Md. 1928).
40 See, e.g., St. Louis Southwestern Ry. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
41 See, e.g., Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 200 S.C. 393, 21 S.E.2d 34 (1942); Sanders Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1962); Abel v. Albina
Engine & Mach. Works, 284 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1960).4 2 See, e.g., Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961).43 See, e.g., Snyder v. Eastern Auto. Distributors, Inc., 357 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1965); Cosper
v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959); Eclipse Fuel Engineering Co.
v. Superior Ct., 148 Cal. App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957); Jones v. General Motors Corp.,
197 S.C. 129, 14 S.E.2d 628 (1941).
44 See Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); Delray Beach Aviation
Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1964).
" See Volkswagen Interamericana v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1966). See also Kessler,
Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957).
46See, e.g., Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ind. 1962);
Jones v. General Motors Corp., 197 S.C. 129, 14 S.E.2d 628 (1941).
4 See Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d 968 (1952).
4 Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1963). Even though
recognized as the Hearne criteria, it is interesting to note that the criteria set forth by Hearne
were first laid down by Judge Ingraham in Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp.,
185 F. Supp. 48, 56 (S.D. Tex. 1960), rev'd on other grds., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961).
4'"[C]essna enjoyed practically the same advantages and benefits to its business from sales of
its products in this state, as it would have done through officers or agents directly representing
it in this state." B.B.P. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 420 P.2d at 142.
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forum,"° the relative convenience of the parties,5 whether the forum had
some special interest in granting relief,55 and whether the cause of action
arose out of activities conducted within the state."
If one is looking for a precise statement of the circumstances in which
a corporation is subject to in personam jurisdiction, he will not find it.
The doctrine of International Shoe has led to problems of interpretation,
application and consistency. However, the test of "certain minimum con-
tacts" which do not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice" is probably the best of the several standards. Another, slightly
different, test for interpreting fact situations was set forth in Sun-X
International Co. v. Witt" where it was stated that:
there are three basic factors which should coincide if jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant is to be entertained, to wit: (1) The non-resident
defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consum-
mate some transaction in the forum State; (2) the cause of action must arise
from, or be connected with, such an act or transaction; and (3) the assump-
tion of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality,
nature and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience
of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state
afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation"
[Emphasis added.].
The result of the instant case is not startling. Nevertheless, this deci-
sion serves as a reminder to other aircraft manufacturers which have sim-
ilar marketing systems. As corporations increase their interstate activities,
the courts have more readily extended their extra-territorial jurisdiction.
It appears that courts are likely to subject foreign corporations to their
jurisdiction unless the forum has been completely avoided. Corporations
would be well advised, therefore, to qualify to "do business" within the
forum rather than incurring the risk and expense of attempting to avoid
jurisdiction. It is not unreasonable that a foreign corporation should pay
for the right of doing business by subjecting itself to the jurisdiction.
Robert E. Wilson
50 Supra note 3 5 and accompanying text.
" "It is consonant with equity and fair dealing to require Cessna to come to this state to defend
against such claims." B.B.P. Ass'n v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 420 P.2d at 142.
" "The purpose of the [Idaho long-arm statute] was to furnish, so far as possible, a local
forum to residents of this state who have a grievance against a nonqualifying foreign corporation,
growing out of its business activities here." Id. at 139.
" The action was for breach of warranty and fraudulent misrepresentation which grew out
of the sales contract.
54413 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" Sun-X Int'l Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). The court in Sun-X
incorporated the two doctrines of O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. S. Ct. 1966)
and Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963) into
one.
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Administrative Law - Aircraft Accident Investigation
Records - Freedom of Information Act
In answer to a growing clamor for greater disclosure of information
held by the executive branch of the Federal Government, Congress has
recently passed an amendment,' popularly known as the Freedom of In-
formation Act, to Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act It is the
purpose of this note to analyze the Freedom of Information Act in relation
to government records concerning the investigation of aircraft accidents
and the availability of those records to private citizens, especially litigants
in private suits arising from such accidents.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the Freedom of Information
Act, two points must be clarified. First, all accident investigation and
safety functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board' (CAB) have been trans-
ferred to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the De-
partment of Transportation.4 Therefore, past practices, regulations, and
court decisions concerning access to investigation records will be discussed
in relation to the CAB, whereas the future effects of the Freedom of In-
formation Act will be related to NTSB regulations. Second, the Free-
dom of Information Act will not, and was not intended to, change the
rules governing the admissibility of investigation records as evidence in
court proceedings. Its sole purpose is to make governmental records more
readily available to the public. Therefore, this note will discuss evidence
only insofar as it relates to the access of records held by the government.
The CAB, and now the NTSB, through the Bureau of Safety,' carry
on extensive investigations to ascertain the facts and to determine the
probable cause of aircraft accidents. The facts found and the conclusions
drawn from those facts are contained in numerous documents and reports
now in the possession of the NTSB. Private litigants involved in suits
arising from aircraft accidents seldom are able to perform such exhaustive
and expensive investigation (for example, the Board investigators immed-
iately isolate an aircraft crash site and only investigative personnel are al-
'Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967), amending $
U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1966), formerly Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). The Freedom of
Information Act under discussion was passed in order to codify the Act of July 4, 1966. The cita-
tions to Congressional reports and to other material is largely based on the original Act, but remains
relevant, since no substantial changes were made.
'Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1966), formerly 5 U.S.C. § 1002
(1964).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 701, 72 Stat. 781, as amended 76 Stat. 921 (1962), 49
U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
4 Department of Transportation Act, § 6(d), 80 Stat. 938, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(d) (Supp. 1966).
For a discussion of the background of the formation of the NTSB and related problems see, Com-
ment, A Critical Analysis of the Department of Transportation, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 314 (1967).
The Bureau of Safety was the primary investigative arm of the CAB. Its delegated functions
were set out in 14 C.F.R. § 386.2 (1967). The Bureau was transferred to the NTSB as a unit and
retains all of its investigative responsibilities.
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lowed in the area). Therefore, the information contained in such records
and reports is particularly important as it is the most thorough and rele-
vant in existence.
In the past, the release of any of this material for use in litigation, or
for any other purpose, by private parties was almost entirely at the dis-
cretion of the CAB officials; and, as will be seen, circumstances virtually
eliminated effective judicial review of such decisions.' However, litigants,
or any private citizens, who are denied access to investigative records may
now seek aid based on the Freedom of Information Act, which will elim-
inate many of the problems previously encountered in the attempt to
obtain such records.7
CAB regulations reserved to the Director of the Bureau of Safety' or
his designee discretion as to the release of documents or information held
by the CAB. 9 The regulations further stated that no CAB employee was
to release any documents or other information in answer to a subpoena
without authorization from the CAB's General Counsel or the Director of
the Bureau of Safety." Rather, a CAB employee was to appear in response
to any subpoena from a court ordering release of CAB records and decline
to produce them on the ground that such production was barred by CAB
regulations." The courts have consistently upheld such regulations," and
have protected the employee from judicial sanction for failure to comply
with court orders.2
The immunity of CAB and other agency employees from judicial sanc-
tion was based on the Federal "Housekeeping" statute, 4 first enacted by
Generally, there has been little trouble in obtaining limited statements of observed facts re-
sulting from aircraft accident investigations. However, the practice was not to release any report
or record which contained an opinion of any kind, even though it also contained observed facts.
14 C.F.R. § 311.2 (1967) set out certain information which was to be released upon request, but
limited information to be released to factual material only. All requests for releases were required
to be based on a showing of good cause.
This note will not discuss release of CAB/NTSB records in those cases in which the Federal
Government is a party to the litigation, since the courts have ruled that non-privileged records are
discoverable as against any private party in such actions. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D.
255 (W.D. La. 1950); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
' While other avenues of discovery are open to litigants in private suits, such as depositions and
interrogatories, it must be recognized that nothing can fully replace an expert, first-hand investigation
of an accident scene.
814 C.F.R. § 386.2 (1967).
i1d. § 311.2.
'0 Id. § 311.3 (e). Upon receiving a subpoena, the employee was to notify the Director of the
Bureau of Safety, who would in turn either give the employee permission to release the requested
records or have the CAB's General Counsel have the employee excused by the court. Procedure for
the NTSB is much the same, with the Executive Director of the NTSB having initial authority as
to the release of documents and records. 10 Av. Cas. 55 13,970-13,995 (1967), 14 C.F.R. § 401,
38 Fed. Reg. 9963 (1967).
" 14 C.F.R. § 311.3(e) (1967).
" The courts have ruled that valid agency and departmental regulations have the force of law,
unless openly and palpably inconsistent with law. See, e.g., Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459
(1900); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); Mt. Vernon Cooperative Bank v. Gleason, 250 F.
Supp. 952 (D. Mass. 1966). The regulations of the NTSB concerning disclosure of information have
been written in accordance with the Freeddm of Information Act.
'
5 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Touhyiv. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1961); Universal Airlines v.
Eastern Airlines, 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
"4Federal Housekeeping Act, as amenddd, 72 Stat. 547 (1958), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). The
amended statute provides that:
The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent
with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks,
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Congress in 1789. The Supreme Court, in two decisions, Boske v. Com-
ingore"5 and United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen,*" interpreted this sta-
tute and regulations promulgated thereunder to immunize from punitive
judicial sanction those department subordinates who refuse to produce
documents or records under proper regulations. The Boske and Touhy
decisions gave valid regulations the force of law, and, in effect, named the
various department and agency heads as the only persons who can be
forced by court action to obey disclosure orders."
Until 1962, any court action brought in an attempt to force release of
CAB records had to be brought in the District of Columbia, as no other
court had in personam jurisdiction over the CAB officials authorized to
release such records under the regulations. Because of the time, expense,
and inconvenience involved, such collateral actions seldom were resorted to
by litigants." In 1962, Congress liberalized this limited venue by the en-
actment of Section 1391(e) of the Judicial Code."9 The purpose of the
section was to allow actions to be brought against government agencies
and officials in district courts outside the District of Columbia,"° thus
making it easier to reach the various agency and department heads. The
Freedom of Information Act reinforces the venue provisions of Section
1391 (e) of the Judicial Code by providing that:
[T]he district court of the United States in the district in which the com-
plainant resides, or has his principle place of business, or in which the agency
records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld. Y [Emphasis added.].
the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation
of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it. This section does not authorize
withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the
public [Emphasis added.].
Until the 1958 amendment (italicized) was added, this statute was the basis for most of the
executive department withholding regulations. For a complete discussion of the statute and the
effect of the amendment, see Note, Discovery front the United States in Suits Between Private Liti-
gants-The 1958 Amendment of the Federal Housekeeping Statute, 69 YALE L.J. 452 (1960).
'5 177 U.S. 459 (1900). An Internal Revenue agent was imprisoned for contempt for refusal to
produce agency reports and records when ordered to do so by the court below. The refusal was
based on Treasury Department regulations forbidding such release of records. The Supreme Court
held that the regulations were valid and had the force of law, and that the head of the Treasury
Department properly reserved to himself determination of all matters as to the release of records
held by the Department.
18340 U.S. 462 (1951). Pursuant to Department of Justice regulations issued by the Attorney
General under authority of the Federal Housekeeping Statute, a subordinate official of the Depart-
ment of Justice refused, in a habeas corpus proceeding against him, to obey a subpoena duces tecum
requiring him to produce papers of the Department in his possession. The Supreme Court held that
the regulations were valid, and that the subordinate properly refused to release the records, and
was not guilty of contempt for such refusal.
I'See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); N.L.R.B. v. Capitol Fish Co., 294
F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961).
"8 Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE
L.J. 477, 478 & n. 5 (1957).
"
8 Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964). The section provides that:
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States
or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity . . . may be brought in any
judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of
action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the
plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.
2
oJ. Moore, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE: JUDICIAL CODE PAMPHLET 581 (1966).
" Freedom of Information Act, § b(c) (3), Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967),
amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1966).
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Even with the broader venue provisions of Section 1391 (e), such dis-
closure actions remained slow and time consuming, and were little used
by litigants seeking CAB records. The Freedom of Information Act now
has reduced these problems of delay as to judicial review of the NTSB's
refusal to release records. The Act provides that the disclosure action au-
thorized will take precedence over all other cases on the court's docket,
unless the court deems other cases of greater importance."2 Litigants now
have a much faster and more convenient judicial remedy in those cases
in which a litigant alleges misconduct on the part of the NTSB, even
though Boske and Touthy may still limit the persons against whom the
action may effectively be brought. Even though disclosure actions will
now be easier to bring, no substantial increase in such cases is predicted.
The mere fact that effective procedure for judicial review is provided in
the Act is an impetus for compliance, and court intervention doubtless
will be seldom necessary.
In addition to making disclosure actions easier to bring, the Freedom of
Information Act provides that the court shall have more effective power
to enforce orders for release of information. The Act provides that, "[i]n
the event of non-compliance with the order of the court, the district court
may punish for contempt the responsible employee. . . ."' The express
grant of contempt power is clear evidence that Congress intended that the
courts shall have paramount authority as to disclosure of NTSB and other
agency records. Although still open to judicial interpretation and appli-
cation, this section of the Act may have the effect of overturning the
Boske and Touhy decisions as they apply to the immunity of subordinate
officials and employees from judicial sanction. However, the courts will
probably be sparing in the application of the contempt powers since wide-
spread application could seriously interfere with the functioning of the
NTSB under its regulations. In the event of non-compliance, the con-
tempt power would probably be applied only to those subordinate officials
who have responsibility for final NTSB action on the release of records,
and other subordinates will still have the duty to follow NTSB regulations
and instructions of the agency head or his delegate.' However, the power
is present and officials will certainly be aware of it when making decisions
as to the release of records."
One of the greatest potential effects of the Freedom of Information Act
on NTSB withholding regulations and policies is on the interpretation and
application of Section 701 (e) of the Federal Aviation Act, which provides
22 Id.
23 Id.
"Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative
Procedure Act, at 28-29 (June 1967).
25 In discussion of the application of contempt powers, mention must be made of the possibility
of a plea of executive immunity from judicial sanction being raised by the responsible official of
the NTSB. Presidential immunity is an unresolved constitutional question, as is the question of
whether a subordinate official is protected as a representative of the President. In 1962, by letter,
President Kennedy informed Congress that the President alone would invoke executive privilege, and
this limitation was confirmed by President Johnson in 1965. H. R. Doc. No. 1497, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1966). This guarantee is revokable at any time, however, and is a factor to be con-
sidered. For a full discussion of the question of executive privilege, see Bishop, supra note 17.
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"[n]o part of any reports of the Board relating to any accident, or the
investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or
action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report
or reports."2 Section 701 (e) was used by the CAB as one of the primary
bases for the withholding of reports and records. This statute now applies
to the NTSB, 7 and there is no reason to believe, in the absence of the
Freedom of Information Act, that it would be treated in a different man-
ner. The CAB's position, based on Section 701 (e), was that if the docu-
ments were to be inadmissible as evidence, then there could be no good
cause to release the records. The CAB, therfore, in applying its regula-
tions, 8 did not release either its preliminary records or reports or the final
CAB report to private parties as a matter of right."
The courts, in interpreting the CAB withholding regulations in the
light of Section 701 (e), attempted to strike a balance between the interests
of the CAB and the litigants in private suits. In Ritts v. American Over-
seas Airlines, Inc." and Tansey v. Transcontinental & Western Airlines,
Inc.a" the courts held that only the CAB's final report was privileged under
701 (e), and that preliminary information gathered during an investiga-
tion was not privileged.2 However, the reports to which the courts were
referring did not include those made by the CAB's own investigators, but
only those made by outside parties involved in the accidents. In Universal
Airlines v. Eastern Airlines' and Craig v. Eastern Airlines' it was held
that reports made by employee investigators which contained the opinions
and conclusions of a CAB employee were the private files of the CAB and,
therefore, not available to the public.
The Freedom of Information Act, read literally, goes further than the
court decisions and would eliminate even the withholding of final NTSB
reports. The Act provides " [e]ach agency . . . shall make available for
public inspection and copying (A) final opinions, including concurring
and dissenting opinions. . ."' The courts, however, may well find that
this does not apply to final NTSB reports, since the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act further provides that its provisions will not apply to records spe-
cifically privileged by previous statutes.a" On the basis of previous court
decisions applied to the CAB, the courts will probably find that 701 (e)
26Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 701 (e), 72 Stat. 781, 49 U.S.C. § 1441 (e) (1964).
27 Although not specifically mentioned as applying to the NTSB, such application may be easily
inferred since the Department of Transportation Act transferred all safety responsibilities of the
CAB to the NTSB.
"s There has been some question as to whether or not CAB construction of the statute
(5 701 (e)) is consistent with the intent of Congress. However, there is virtually no legislative
history to look to as a guide. See 25 J. AIR L. & CoM. 235 (1958).
29 15 Fed. Reg. 6442 (1950).
'097 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
' 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1949).
"2 The accident investigators commonly request the aid and assistance of outside parties, such
as the airlines and aircraft manufacturers, involved in the accident. These parties frequently file
with the CAB/NTSB reports containing vital information not otherwise available to private litigants.
33 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
3440 F.R.D. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
" Freedom of Information Act, § a(2) (A), Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967),
amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1966).
181d. S 4(b) (3).
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does extend to final NTSB reports, making them privileged, even though
701 (e) deals in terms of admissibility as evidence and not in terms of gen-
eral availability. Such construction will probably be deemed necessary in
order to insure that accident investigation by the government will not be
hampered." The Freedom of Information Act will have no effect on re-
ports made by government investigators, since these reports are consid-
ered intra-agency communications, which are specifically exempted from
disclosure."s Further, the Act exempts investigative files compiled in con-
nection with agency adjudicative proceedings."s The most important effect
in this area is to make the majority of the investigative records available,
or potentially available, as a matter of right, and the separation of avail-
ability to the public from the concept of admissibility as evidence.
The main purpose of the Freedom of Information Act was to turn Sec-
tion 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act' into a true "public informa-
tion" section. The original Section 3 gave the officials of executive agencies
virtually unlimited power of discretion as to the release of any informa-
tion. The basis for this discretion was found in such ambiguous and un-
defined terms as "except for good cause found [and] ...in the public
interest. .. ." Even if no good reason could be found under such terms as
those mentioned, the records were to be made available only to "persons
properly and directly concerned." 1
In order to correct the abuses of the original section, the Freedom of
Information Act sets out specific categories of information to be exempted
from disclosure under the Act." Although the exemptions in themselves
are broad, the intention of Congress as to what they cover is clear, and the
courts should have little trouble in properly applying the exempting
provisions.
The most important change made by the Freedom of Information Act
is the provision for effective judicial review of NTSB or other agency
action. Although under the Judicial Code the courts had the power to force
the CAB to reach a final decision," no statute provided for proper review
of that decision once it was made. The primary reason for the courts' in-
ability to act was that the complainant usually did not know the reasons
for the CAB's refusal to release the desired records, other than that the
responsible officials had determined that there was "good cause" to with-
hold them. The inability of the complaining party to present a case ren-
a' For a complete discussion of the Federal Government's interests in withholding accident
investigation records, see 25 J. AIR L. & CoM. 235 (1958).
S"Freedom of Information Act, 5 b(5), Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967),
amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1966).
S9 ld. § b(7).
Administrative Procedure Act, § 3, 5 U.S.C. S 552 (Supp. 1966), formerly 5 U.S.C.
1002 (1964).
41 Id.
' Freedom of Information Act, § b, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967), amending
5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1966).
4Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964). This section provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
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dered the CAB's decision as to what would be released virtually the final
authority.4
The Freedom of Information Act corrects the problem of review in two
ways. First, the court proceedings are to be de novo, so that the court is
not involved with mere judicial sanction of agency orders, but instead re-
places the official's discretion with that of the courts.' The court is, there-
fore, free to exercise fully the traditional power of equity in determining
whether or not the relief sought should be granted, and may properly bal-
ance the interests of all parties concerned."
The second major change is a shift of the burden of proof. Under the
original section, the complainant had to show that the CAB had in fact
improperly withheld the material requested, even though he frequently
did not know the reasons for the withholding. Now, the NTSB must
prove to the court that the withholding action was proper and in accord-
ance with the Freedom of Information Act." The shift of burden will have
the effect of making access to the NTSB's records a matter of right for
all persons, without a showing that there is good cause for such release.
With the constant growth of air travel and the accompanying increase
in litigation involving aircraft accidents, the NTSB's investigations will
take on more and more importance, both in safety regulation and in liti-
gation. In order to obtain the fairest adjudication of his cause of action,
a litigant should have free access to all material pertinent to his case, and
NTSB records may well be the only source of that material. At the same
time, to achieve maximum effectiveness, the NASB must have full access
to all relevant facts in its investigations, and, in order to obtain this access,
must be able to operate as freely as possible from the area of private litiga-
tion. The Freedom of Information Act reflects an attempt to balance these
conflicting interests, and the courts will be cognizant of those interests in
interpreting and applying the Act. While the future may see no great
change in the type of information made available, it will now become
more readily available; and, as intended, the interests of the private liti-
gant will receive greater protection.
B. L. Florsheim
44 HOUSE GOVT. OPERATIONS COMM., GOVERNMENT INFORMATION-PUBLIC ACCEss, H.R.
Doc. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966). The courts have consistently declared their
authority to make the final determination as to the disclosure of executive department records.
See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Line,
Inc., 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1966); N.L.R.B. v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961).
In those cases involving an issue of evidence, the courts have been able to exercise some control.
But where the question is the mere release of executive records, especially investigative records, the
circumstances brought out in this note have prevented effective judicial control.
45'Freedom of Information Act, § a(3), Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967),
amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1966).
4' Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative
Procedure Act, at 28 (June 1967).47 Freedom of Information Act, § a(3), Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967),




Air Traffic Control - Wake Turbulence Warning -
Government Liability
An action was brought against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act' for the negligence of its air traffic controllers in the
death of a student pilot, who was killed along with his instructor when
their small aircraft encountered wake turbulence and crashed on takeoff.
The local control tower cleared plaintiff's aircraft for takeoff behind a
DC-8 jet airliner and warned it of the wake turbulence of the departing
aircraft. In apparent disregard of this warning, plaintiff commenced his
takeoff roll which the control tower personnel observed but did not attempt
to prevent. The government appealed from the trial court finding of
negligence on the part of the air traffic controllers. Held, affirmed: The
tower personnel were negligent in failing to attempt to prevent plaintiff's
takeoff and encounter with wake turbulence, such failure proximately
resulting in the fatal crash.2 United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965
(9th Cir. 1967).
The government contended that, having given the wake turbulence
warning, as required and outlined in the Air Traffic Control Procedural
Manual, tower personnel have no further responsibility in this regard. The
trial court found the United States negligent on two theories. The first
theory was that tower controllers have a duty beyond that prescribed by
the Air Traffic Regulations3 and the Air Traffic Control Procedure Manual.'
The court stated that controllers must do more than give a warning of
wake turbulence; they must withhold or delay the takeoff of an aircraft
if it is possible that the aircraft will encounter wake turbulence. This
"follow the book" theory was neither accepted nor rejected by the appel-
late court because it felt that in light of the specific facts, the second
theory was sufficient ground for affirming the lower decision. The appel-
late court's second theory of liability was based on the failure of the tower
personnel to act to prevent the accident when it became apparent that the
1 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
'The appellate court in the present case used the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321
(1965) as authority for its holding. This section states that there is a duty to act when prior con-
duct is found to be dangerous.
3 "Have been duly adopted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, pursuant to
section 1348(d) .. " Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 999 (D. Hawaii 1965). These
regulations have the force of law.
' These have been issued by the Federal Aviation Administrator but have not been adopted in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1348(d) (1964).
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earlier warning had been disregarded. The appellate court stated that
when it became apparent to the controllers that their earlier warning of
wake turbulence had been disregarded, it became their duty to further
warn the pilot of the impending danger. The main significance of the
appellate court's opinion is the fact that it extends the duty of air traffic
controllers when it becomes apparent that their warnings have been dis-
regarded and an aircraft is in danger.'
L.R.J., Jr.
Government Liability - Air Traffic Controllers -
Responsibility
Plaintiff, Gordon Tilley, joined the United States and Delta Airlines as
defendants in a suit to recover for injuries sustained when the aircraft on
which he was a passenger skidded off the runway after the pilot inadvert-
antly applied too much power while complying with instruction from the
air traffic controller to clear the runway. The controller, followed the
generally used practice of "one off, one on,"' had instructed Delta to taxi
onto the runway and hold its position immediately after a Sabena aircraft
had landed but before it had cleared the runway. Sabena did not exit from
one of the first three available exists, and at this time the controller realized
there would not be sufficient time for Delta to takeoff and for an inbound
Air France, already in the landing pattern, to land. Of the two available
alternative actions-1. to have Delta clear the runway or 2. to have Air
France execute a missed approach-the former was chosen since it would
result in a delay to Delta of only fifteen to twenty seconds whereas the
latter would require Air France to fly an additional eighty miles. The
action against Delta, tried before a jury, resulted in a verdict in favor of
Delta. The United States was found liable on the same evidence by the
court under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the negligence of its em-
ployee in failing to follow applicable regulations which were in effect at
the time and have the force of law' and in failing to anticipate and pre-
vent an emergency situation. The United States appealed, contending that
the primary duty for the safe operation of an aircraft rests with the pilot.
Held, Reversed: Considering all of the circumstances, the plaintiff's injury
was not attributable to any negligence of the controller or to any breach
'In Hartz v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965), which had a similar fact situa-
tion, the court held that all that is required of the air traffic controller is that he follow the pro-
cedure as set out in his manual. This case is presently on appeal.
' The practice of permitting a departing aircraft to take a position on a runway not yet
vacated by an incoming aircraft is common at major airfields during periods of peak operations.
aUnited States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828
(1960). Sections 400.1, 419.1, 419.3 and 422.5 of the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual were
specifically involved in this case. Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678, 680-81 nn, 2 & 3, 683
(4th Cir. 1967).
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of duty owed by the Government to the plaintiff. Tilley v. United States,
375 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1967).
Based upon regulations' and case holdings4 the final duty for the safe
operation of an aircraft, while under VFR conditions, rests with the pilot,
and he may disregard instructions from the tower if he feels that com-
pliance with such instruction will jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or
passengers. The accident was not the result of the violation of applicable
regulations. First, the controller was authorized to position Delta on the
runway before Sabena had cleared and likewise was authorized to instruct
Delta to clear the runway to allow Air France to land. The accident that
followed was simply the result of the failure of the pilot to execute the
required maneuver with the requisite skill. All of the instructions were
proper whether an emergency situation existed or not.' Second, since
Delta had its radio tuned to the same frequency as Air France and the
tower (the Delta pilot later testified that he was sure he could execute the
maneuver safely and that the controller had made the proper decisions at
the time of the accident), the controller adequately complied with the
regulations requiring that he provide pilots with all necessary information.
Third, any violation of the regulation requiring that an arriving aircraft
will not pass over or in close proximity to departing aircraft could not
have been the proximate cause of the accident since Air France did not
pass over Delta until after the accident had occurred, and the fact that
Air France was able to safely circle the airport tends to indicate the safety
of the entire operation. In conclusion, the air traffic controller is responsible
only for supplying information to pilots and not for the physical control,
guidance, and operation of the aircraft. This must be the rule since "the
air traffic controller has a duty to all aircraft in, near and over the airport
and cannot devote his undivided attention to a single aircraft."'
R.H.E.
Carrier - Federal Aviation Act - Certification Procedures
Petitioners, Tampa, Florida and San Antonio, Texas, requested review
of certain preliminary orders issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board pur-
suant to its Transpacific Route Investigation proceedings. The investiga-
a 60.2 Civil Air Regulations: "The pilot in command of the aircraft shall be directly responsible
for its operation and shall have final authority as to operation of the aircraft. In emergency situa-
tions which require immediate decision and action the pilot may deviate from the rules prescribed
in this part to the extent required by consideration of safety." 375 F.2d 678, 681 n. 4 (4th Cir.
1967).
4 United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963),
United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 326-327, Hartz v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 119,
125 (N.D. Ga. 1965), Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499, 517 (D. Del. 1964).
' The Delta pilot testified that he was led to believe that an emergency existed from the tone
of the controller's voice in issuing the instruction to vacate the runway.
a Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678, 684 (4th Cir. 1967).
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tion concerned air carrier certification of route extensions1 from the
United States mainland to Hawaii and other areas. One of its principle
objectives was examination of "the pattern of operations by United States
carriers in foreign and overseas air transportation in the Pacific." Peti-
tioners were among a total of seventy-two mainland cities making applica-
tion for non-stop service to the the Pacific but were excluded from initial
consideration when the number of applicants was reduced to twenty-five
as a result of a consolidation order issued by the Board. Petitions for re-
consideration and intervention were denied and it was from these pre-
liminary orders that appeal was made. Held, Afir-ined: "we find no basis
for holding that the Board abused its discretion in this regard or otherwise
arbitrarily discriminated against petitioners." City of San Antonio v.
C.A.B., 374 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
In eliminating the applications of petitioners and forty-five other
cities from initial consideration, "the Board used three criteria: size, traffic
generating capacity, and geographical location."' The remaining twenty-
five cities were joined in the hearings by way of a consolidation order.
It was maintained by petitioners that the criteria used by the Board were
either illegal per se or arbitrarily applied to them, and that the findings
on which the consolidation order was based were inadequate in that they
did not comply with legislatively established guidelines. More specifically,
petitioners urged that such procedures do not comply with the require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act.' Taking exception to this
point, the court noted that Congress intended to allow the Board free
exercise of its discretion to work out application procedures.4 It has been
judicially recognized that consolidation, scope of inquiry, and similar
questions are of a housekeeping nature within the discretion of the agency
and, due process considerations aside, are no concern for the courts.' Con-
cerning intervention, petitioner's argument seemed to be predicated upon
the belief that all persons interested in a proceeding have a right to par-
ticipate as fully accredited parties. Pointing out that the Act merely pro-
vides that "any interested person may file with the Board a protest or
memorandum of opposition to or in support of the issuance of a certifi-
cate"' and recognizing that the Board may permit intervention, the court
emphasized that rules have been promulgated intended to accommodate
all third-party interests in this respect.' The court was of the opinion that
petitioner's interests would be adequately protected by Rule 14 (b),' which
1Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401, 72 Stat. 754, as amended (1962), 49 U.S.C. S 1371
(1964).
2City of San Antonio v. C.A.B., 374 F.2d 326, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
aThese guidelines are outlined in 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(c) (Supp. 1966), formerly Section 8(b) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 242, 5 U.S.C. S 1007 (1964).
'City of San Antonio v. C.A.B., 374 F.2d 326, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See 49 U.S.C. 5 1481
(1964).
'F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(c), 72 Stat. 754, as amended (1962), 49 U.S.C. §
1371(c) (1964).
'CAB Rule 15(b), 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (1967), provides that the Board may allow inter-
vention as a matter of discretion and sets out certain guide lines.
8CAB Rule 14(b), 14 C.F.R. § 302.14(b) (1967).
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permits interested parties to appear at hearings, present relevant evidence,
cross-examine witnesses and offer written statemnets on the issues involved.
This decision is useful in that it provides a clear statement of the rights
of similarly situated applicants before the Civil Aeronautics Board.
M. E. D., Jr.
Taxation - Assessment and Valuation - Short Term, No
Renewal Leases (or Leasehold Interests in Airport)
Seven airlines1 held leasehold interests in part of the St. Louis Municipal
Airport. The assessed valuation was computed using a formula based on
an "assumed" remaining lease term of eight years although each lease was
to expire in less than three years with no right of renewal. This formula,
which involved an eight-year "multiplier,"' enabled the Assessor to com-
pute a valuation on each lease's fair rental value' that exceeded the con-
tract rental4 remaining to be paid. Had the Assessor based his calculations
on the remaining term of each lease (using a "multiplier" of less than
three years), the contract rental would have exceeded the fair rental value
and resulted in a zero valuation for assessment purposes. The airlines
jointly appealed this assessment to the State Tax Commission of Missouri,'
who decided that the lease had no value as of the date of assessment because
the contract rental exceeded the fair rental value. The Assessor petitioned
for review of the Commission's decision. The trial court upheld the As-
sessor's valuation and set aside the Commission's findings. The appeals were
consolidated. Held, reversed: The State Tax Commission's findings were
affirmed because of evidence that: (1) the Airlines' leases were short-
term; (2) the leases were not readily marketable; (3) the contract rental
exceeded the fair rental value; and (4) the leases therefore had a zero
valuation for assessment purposes. St. Louis County v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on Land
Clearance for Redevelopment Corp. v. Doernhoefer, 389 S.W.2d 780,
which noted, at 788, that most courts view the fair market value of a
' Ozark Airlines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., American Airlines, Inc., Central Air Lines,
Inc., Braniff Airways, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and Delta Air Lines, Inc.
' In computing assessed valuation, the Assessor used a "multiplier" of ninety-six, viz. the num-
ber of months in eight years, which he then multiplied times the average monthly rental paid by
a lessee; the Assessor then reduced this amount by one-third to arrive at the assessed value. St.
Louis County v. State Tax Comm'n, 406 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Mo. 1966).
a "Fair rental value" or "economic rental" is the fair market value of the "use and occupancy"
of the leased premises at the time of appraisal. St. Louis County v. State Tax Comm'n, 406 S.W.2d
644, 650 (Mo. 1966).
4 "Contract rental" or "contractual rental" is the amount of rent for the unexpired term of the
lease.
' They made the joint appeal after individual appeals to the St. Louis County Board of Equaliza-
tion which denied each and every appeal. St. Louis County v. State Tax Comm'n, 406 S.W.2d 644
(Mo. 1966).
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leasehold interest as the difference between the fair rental value of the
premises for the unexpired term and the contract rental This fair market
value, sometimes called "bonus value," "leasehold savings," "rental sav-
ings," or profit does not exist if the contract rental exceeds the fair rental
value. Though many factors7 are important in determining the fair market
value of a leasehold interest, the crucial one in this case was the length of
the unexpired term which affected (1) the marketability of the lease (i.e.,
the longer the unexpired term the greater the marketability) ; and (2) the
determination of the "multiplier"' (the number of years or months that
is multiplied times the average monthly rental to provide a fair market
value of the lease for valuation purposes). Because the unexpired term of
the lease was less than three years and was not renewable, the court agreed
with the State Commission that (1) the lease was not marketable; and
(2) that the use of the eight-year "multiplier" by the Assessor was errone-
ous, for when the short-term "multiplier" was used the contract rental
exceeded the fair rental value and thus there was no fair market value of
the leasehold interest. Although the "short-term, no-renewal" situation will
not often be encountered, the case is significant nonetheless in emphasizing
that in such a situation the actual unexpired term, not the "assumed" term
of the lease, is the figure to be considered both in estimating marketability
and in computing the "multiplier" used to figure fair rental value, then
fair market value of the lease, and finally, assessed valuation.
R.N.V.
Air Charter - Agency - Carrier Liability
In 1964 Capitol Airways entered into a limited agency agreement with
Nelson Travel Service (Friedman) to solicit and develop traffic for the
New York State Teachers Study Group (NYSTSG) charter to Europe.
Just prior to takeoff in July 1965, Capitol, having failed to receive the
balance of the price from Friedman, called a special meeting with the
charterer and its members, at which it was agreed to exact an additional
sum from each passenger to cover the full overseas tariff price, since Fried-
man had embezzled the money and disappeared. Held: The CAB found
6 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1945); Edmund Realty Co. v. Walmer Bldg.
Co., 123 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1941); Philadelphia, W. & P. R. Co. v. Appeal Tax Court, 50 Md. 397,
245 A.2d 926 (1956); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 62 Wash. 409, 113 P. 114 (1911);
Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 286.
[T]he value of the leasehold should be determined from the testimony of qualified expert
witnesses as that value which a buyer under no compulsion to purchase the tenancy would pay to
a seller under no compulsion to sell, taking into consideration the period of the lease yet to run,
including the unexercised right of renewal, the favorable and unfavorable factors of the leasehold
estate, the location, type, and construction of the building, the business of the tenant, comparable
properties in similar neighborhoods, present market conditions, and future market trends, and all
other material factors that would enter into the determination of the market value of the property.
Land Clearance for Redevelopment Corp. v. Doernhoefer, 389 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo. 1965).
8 Supra, note 2.
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Friedman to be Capitol's collecting agent, notwithstanding the fact that
he was president of the study group and contrary clauses appeared in the
agency contract. Capitol acquiesed in Friedman's acceptance of checks from
the charterer payable to himself and tolerated repeated defaults by Fried-
man in transmitting payments as! prescribed in the contract. Therefore,
Capitol violated section 403 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
collecting a greater compensation for fares than specified in its tariffs.
Capitol Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 16370,
CAB Order No. E-24999, 19 Dec. 1966.
The law of agency requires that when a principal acquieses in his agent's
unauthorized conduct, the principal will be bound thereby.' The CAB
examiner found unchallenged evidence that (1) it was common practice
in the industry for carriers to accept charter payments in the form of
checks drawn on the agent's account (2) Capitol received checks drawn by
Nelson, deposited them to its own account, and credited them as partial
payment on the July charter and (3) Capitol never suggested to the study
group that its remittances must be payable to Capitol's own order and
never communicated directly with the study group but (4) granted an
extension of time based on the judgment that Friedman would pay the
charter price. The CAB examiner concluded from this evidence that Capi-
tol was Friedman's principal; that when the teachers sent their respective
checks to Friedman for the trip, Capitol was constructively receiving the
money.
The examiner also used language to the effect that Capitol put Fried-
man in a position to enable him to commit a fraud upon the study group,
therefore, Capitol should be subject to liability to such third persons for
the fraud.' As a result, Friedman's embezzlement was from Capitol and
not from the study group. So subsequent collections by Capitol were in
excess of its stated tariff and violative of section 403 (b).' Once the exami-
ner concluded that the relationship of principal and agent existed between
Capitol and Friedman, the result reached by the Board was inescapable.
The Board declined discretionary review of the examiner's finding.
F.J.C.
Landlord and Tenant - Indemnity Agreement - Attorney's
Fees and Litigation Expenses
North Central Airlines leased airport facilities from the city of Aberdeen.
In the lease, the airline agreed to indemnify the city for losses incurred
from its use and occupancy of the premises, except where the loss was
'Bronson's Executor v. Chappell, 79 U.S. 681 (1870); Ramsey v. Miller, 202 N.Y. 72, 95 N.E.
35 (1911).
a Reusche v. California Pacific Title Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 731, 42 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1965).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403 (b), 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1964).
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caused by negligence of the city.' An action was brought against the air-
line by a passenger who tripped on a rubber mat in North Central's termi-
nal area. North Central impleaded the city,' claiming that if there was any
fault it was by the city which had the duty to keep the area in repair. The
city answered with a general denial and counterclaimed against the air-
line seeking attorney's fees, costs, and expenses under the indemnity agree-
ment. The jury found the airline free of negligence. The district court
found that there was no negligence by the city and that the injury was
due solely to the passenger's negligence and awarded the city the litigation
expenses and attorney's fees sought under the counterclaim. North Central
appealed. Held, affirmed: The airline must pay by virtue of the indemnity
agreement. The findings by the district judge were not clearly erroneous
and therefore must stand. North Central Airlines v. City of Aberdeen,
370 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1966).
The principal question presented to the appellate court was whether the
district court's findings were acceptable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 (a).' In
finding them acceptable, the court first disposed of the airline's contention
that the city was negligent as a matter of law. Then looking to the record,
the court concluded that the decision below was not clearly erroneous in
findings of fact. Thus, under the standard of Rule 52 (a) the decision was
affirmed. The airline also argued in its appeal that because the city had
insurance coverage, the obligation to indemnify no longer existed. The
court rejected the argument, stating that the insurance could not exonerate
the airline's duty to indemnify.4 In essence, the appellate court related the
lease provisions to the facts and conclusions of the lower court which were
found acceptable. The airline assumed a liability in its lease and was cor-
rectly held to that agreement.
N.D.K.
Construction Contracts - Delay - Damages
The plaintiff, Luria Brothers, contracted to build an airplane hangar for
the United States Bureau of Yards and Docks. One month after the
plaintiff began work, using the plans supplied by the defendant, the de-
fendant, doubting the sufficiency of the contract depth of the foundations,
had its own architect-engineer inspect the site. The architect advised that
the foundations provided for in the contract were inadequate, and the de-
' Article X of the lease provided: "The Lessee agrees to indemnify and hold the Lessor harmless
from and against all liabilities, judgments, cost, damages and expense which may accrue against . . .
Lessor . . . arising from the Lessee's use and occupancy . . . under any circumstances except when
caused by the Lessor's sole negligence or by the joint negligence of Lessor and any person other than
the Lessee."
2FEo. R. Crv. P. 14(a).
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (a) deals with findings by a district court, stating that findings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
'The court relied on Safway Rental & Sales Co. v. Albina Engine & Mach. Works, Inc., 343
F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1965) and Lesmark, Inc. v. Pryce, 334 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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fendant ordered the plaintiff to stop all work on them so that further
tests could be made. More than one year later, the government sent the
plaintiff a revised foundation drawing, directing that the foundation be
deepened, but only one foot at a time, subject to the defendant's inspec-
tion of each foot. The trial commissioner allowed the plaintiff's claim for
delay costs for idle equipment, field supervision, winter protection, re-
handling materials, maintaining excavations, wage and material price in-
creases, and additional insurance premiums. The plaintiff appealed a re-
fusal to allow damages for excess home office overhead and loss of pro-
ductivity.
Held: The changes the defendant made in the plans were so great that
they did not fall within the scope of the original contract, and therefore
constituted a breach of the implied promise that neither party would do
anything to hinder or delay the other party in performance of the con-
tract. Since the delay was due to the defendant's own defective plans, de-
fendant is liable for all damages that resulted, including home office over-
head and loss of productivity of his labor force. Luria Brothers & Com-
pany v. United States, 369 F.2d 701 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
The Court of Claims awarded home office overhead expenses because
they arose out of job operating expense in the field. Such recovery was
limited, however, to expenses for those days of the total overrun period
which were caused by the defendant's delay.' The award for loss of pro-
ductivity was based on the fact that the delay forced the plaintiff to work
during the more difficult winter months and in adverse water conditions.
Also, the defendant's demand for inspections at one-foot intervals neces-
sitated constant revisions which resulted in confusion and interruptions.
An injured party is entitled to recover all reasonably foreseeable damages,
both direct and indirect, resulting from defendant's breach.'
N.A.E.
The court found the defendant was responsible for only 420 days of the $18 day delay.
WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1344 (Rev. ed. 1938).
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